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Food Price Volatility in Ethiopia: 
Public Pressure and State Response
Tassew Woldehanna and Yisak Tafere
Abstract The global market, variable agricultural production and irregular trading practices have marked 
food price volatility in Ethiopia over the last decade. However, the recent decline in global prices of food 
and fuel, coupled with state intervention in managing the supply of consumer goods, have brought some 
stability to food prices in 2014/15. While the safety net and price control measures could help mitigate 
the aggravation of impacts of food price increases on poor families, a more comprehensive food security 
approach is necessary. The article argues the importance of enhancing the purchasing power of the people.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the Ethiopian economy showed 
steady growth. On average the gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth between 2001 and 2014 was 
9 per cent, with the highest growth registered between 
2003 and 2010, at 11.4 per cent per annum. The 
per capita income was £83 (US$129) per person in 
2001, and grew to £408 (US$632) per person in 2014 
(MoFED 2014). According to a recent report by the 
Ministry of  Finance and Economic Development, 
poverty reduction, improvements in food security, 
and children’s progress in education and nutritional 
achievements have been driven by this economic 
growth and growth in the incomes of  those below 
the poverty line (MoFED 2013a). This usually results 
from one of  two channels – growth in incomes or 
redistribution of  benefits to people living in poverty. 
Economic growth has played the most important role 
in poverty reduction over the past 15 years. In urban 
areas, infrastructural development (e.g. cobblestone 
construction) and its use of  labour has increased the 
incomes of  many of  those living in poverty.
Despite the general improvements in living 
conditions for Ethiopians, around 25 million people 
in the country (29 per cent of  the population) live 
below the nationally defined poverty line (MoFED 
2012, 2013a). Chronic malnutrition is very high at 
40 per cent (CSA 2014). In recent years, inflation 
has been a major shock. National statistics (MoFED 
2013b, 2014) show that food price volatility in 
Ethiopia started in 2003 and the average food 
inflation rate rose and fell sharply (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1). In 2014, food prices were high while food 
inflation was in single digits. The main objective 
of  this article is thus to examine how people and 
government have dealt with the extraordinary levels 
of  food price volatility in Ethiopia in recent years.
This article draws on a three-year qualitative study 
carried out in two communities in Ethiopia as 
part of  the Life in a Time of  Food Price Volatility 
project.1 Data were collected in 2012, 2013, and 
2014 in the month of  August. The urban study area 
is a woreda2 in a Kolfe Keraniyo sub-city of  Addis 
Ababa, where people earn their living as traders, 
civil servants, artisans, vendors, house renters, grain 
sellers, vegetable growers and daily labourers or are 
pensioners. The main sources of  employment in the 
community are wood and metalwork, construction, 
tailoring, food processing, cobblestones and casual 
labour. The majority of  the residents of  this area 
are poor. The rural site is a village in Adami Tulu 
Woreda, Eastern Zone of  Oromia Region. Nearly 
all people in the community are poor and earn 
their living through rain-fed farming while some are 
involved in petty trade and wage labour. In seasons 
of  poor rains many households find it hard to meet 
their food needs.
Data collection methods included focus group 
discussions and interviews with key informants and 
householders. In each community we organised 
eight focus groups, 11 key informant interviews, 
and 22 household case studies. The focus group 
discussions covered diverse groups of  people from 
each community, with a focus on women, youth, 
mixed groups (gender, age, occupation, religion, 
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etc), and those engaged in grain production (rural) 
and traders (urban). Key informants included local 
administrators and other government officials, 
farmers, traders, consumers, and representatives of  
local organisations. Household interviewees were 
selected for diversity in economic status, family 
background and types of  livelihoods (farmers, daily 
labourers and traders).
2 Food price volatility
Study respondents made it clear that there had 
been a noticeable price increase of  food items in 
September 2007. Food prices increased remarkably 
during the Ethiopian Millennium festive season. In 
the urban areas the major change was an increase in 
the rent of  housing, mainly because guests coming 
from abroad in numbers for the festivities raised 
the demand. In the rural areas rainfall failure, an 
increase in the price of  inputs (fertilisers, selected 
seeds, pesticides), and the profit-seeking grain 
traders were blamed for the rapid price rises. After 
2007 prices continued to rise, increasing even more 
rapidly between 2011 and 2012 when, in one year, 
farmers in Adami Tulu explained that the price of  
a quintal of  selected wheat seeds increased from 
860 birr (£27) to 1,130 birr (£35), selected maize 
seeds from 800 birr (£25) to 1,400 birr (£44) 
and fertilisers from 1,120 birr (£35) to 1,500 birr 
Table 1 Trends in food and non-food inflation
Inflation
Year   Food Non-food General
2000   -5.5 4.5 -1.5
2001   -14.4 0.3 -8.2
2002   2.5 0.1 1.7
2003   27.7 1.8 17.8
2004   3.0 3.9 3.2
2005   13.7 7.2 11.7
2006   14.3 11.5 13.6
2007   22.1 11.8 18.0
2008   60.3 22.0 44.4
2009   3.3 18.2 8.5
2010   1.7 19.2 8.2
2011   38.4 24.7 33.2
2012   28.4 19.4 24.1
2013   26.9 18.4 22.9
2014   6.7 11.6 8.9
Source MoFED (2013b, 2014). National income account estimates.
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(£47) in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Despite an 
increase in harvest in some years, the price rarely 
declined, mainly because of  high costs of  inputs and 
increased urban demand for food grains. However 
in 2014, with the decline in the price of  oil in global 
markets price of  inputs, notably fertiliser, declined 
significantly and food prices appeared to stabilise.
The other feature of  food price volatility in the 
study communities is its seasonality. Food items get 
cheaper in autumn (November–January) but become 
very expensive during the summer (July–October). 
Autumn (October–December) is a harvest season 
when most farmers collect their harvest and make it 
available for market. During this season, poor people 
in rural areas have some produce for consumption 
and rarely go to market to buy grains and the urban 
population can buy food items for lower prices than 
in other seasons. During the harvest season farmers 
sell their products in bulk because they need some 
money to buy non-food necessities, so prices fall 
rapidly. Mrs H., a 30-year-old farmer3 from Eastern 
Oromia summarised this by saying:
Farmers usually sell their grains immediately after harvest 
season in November or December… They need to cover 
costs of  inputs, tax, and school expenses for children, 
clothes, spices, etc. Food crops are also sold to cover social 
contributions such as Iddir,4 marriage ceremonies and 
other festivities. As the result, the price of  food crops 
declines immediately after the harvest season.
The biggest outlay for farmers at this time is to 
pay the costs of  improved seed, fertilisers and 
pesticides that they obtained on credit during the 
preceding summer. Thus, they are obliged to sell 
their produce at a much lower price during these 
seasons to meet their obligations. For example, in 
the rural community farmers reported that in 2012, 
they sold a quintal of  teff for 600 birr in the autumn 
and rebought it for 1,600 birr in the summer. Many 
producers become consumers during the summer.
3 Ways of coping
People respond to food price rises in different 
ways. Most work hard to earn more. In the context 
of  limited job opportunities, very few succeed in 
generating more income, however, so they also 
change their consumption behaviour.
3.1 Reduced consumption
The first thing people do to cope with the effect 
of  higher food prices is to reduce the quantity 
and quality of  food they are eating. Respondents 
reported that when there is food shortage, they skip 
some meals or eat low-quality food. A 24-year-old 
farmer5 from Eastern Oromia explained:
We eat insufficient and poor-quality food. The household should 
have eaten four times a day. However, we could not eat even 
three times a day. The variety was very good in winter but now 
[summer] the variety has declined and we mainly eat bread with 
cabbage. We rarely prepare shiro wot6 or eat meat or vegetables.
Figure 1 Price levels in Ethiopia (year 2005=100)
Source MoFED (2014). National income account estimates.
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Even children are not encouraged to eat enough. 
A 30-year-old mother7 speaking at a focus group 
discussion in the Addis Ababa site said:
In the past, children were welcomed to eat as much as they 
can, but now they are not encouraged to consume more 
food. Instead, their mothers get angry when the children ask 
for food and say Afer bila! [Eat the soil!].
A 40-year-old poor woman8 who feeds seven 
members of  her family by selling enjera9 and dried 
herbs for cooking explained how her family has been 
affected:
We are suffering from food shortage. When I do not have 
cooking oil, sugar or even shiro, we eat only a piece of  
bread with no stew… If  we get food today, we may not 
have any tomorrow. If  we eat in the morning, we may 
not eat in the afternoon… we do not eat teff enjera10 
anymore, but rather a piece of  bread because we buy 
[wheat] flour from the kebele11… We no more use food 
oil or onions for stew… when I take 100 birr to market to 
buy food items it buys the equivalent of  what I used to buy 
for 1 birr in the past.
She buys teff and prepares enjera for sale, but her 
family members do not eat it because they have to 
sell it to earn some profit. They instead consume 
bread, which is cheaper.
3.2 Alternative consumption: processed food
Over the study years we learned that people have 
increasingly been resorting to processed food. It 
started as snacks, but nowadays fast food is becoming 
the regular meal for many. In the urban community 
boiled and roasted maize, boiled sweet potatoes, 
samosa, potato chips, roasted biscuits, coffee and 
various types of  roasted grains (kolo) are sold at the 
roadside. Many of  the young, students, taxi assistants, 
shoe shiners, drivers and daily labourers consume 
these filling, but often less nutritious and sometimes 
dangerous foods as their main meal.
In the rural community people sell both traditional 
and modern pre-prepared foods and drinks: they 
may sell enjera with or without wot (stew), fish soup, 
farso (local beer), keneto (a drink made from barley), 
shemeta (non-alcoholic beer), or they sell packaged 
biscuits, juice and soft drinks outside their houses. 
Young and adult men from the community and 
migrant labourers who work on neighbouring 
irrigation farms prefer these fast foods as they are 
easily accessible on the street and are both tasty 
and cheap. There are some concerns associated 
with processed food, mainly related to hygiene and 
sanitation. The food is prepared on the roadside 
with no shelter, exposed to sun and dust. Many also 
doubt the quality of  the cooking oil used. Rural 
householders report that it is much easier to buy 
enjera from the local shops and serve their guests at 
home. It has reduced the burden on the housewives. 
They want to use their labour in working on the 
farms instead of  preparing food at home.
The study shows that people on low incomes are 
responding to high and volatile prices by changing their 
consumption habits and also that families generally 
find it hard to address the problem on their own. They 
feel that they were overwhelmed not only by the food 
price shocks of  2007 and 2011, but by their aftermath. 
Ultimately, they look for the state to help. 
4 Public pressure and state response
Following sporadic food crises over the decades, the 
Ethiopian government has developed an increasingly 
efficient institutional readiness to respond to hunger. 
Since 2005 it has provided support to areas deemed 
food insecure through its Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP) during the hunger periods, 
usually in spring and the summer. After 2008, the 
PSNP was complemented by the other food security 
programmes (OFSPs) and the Household Asset 
Building Programme (HABP). An impact assessment 
(Berhane et al. 2011) showed that the PSNP had 
improved household food security of  PSNP 
beneficiaries by 1.05 months, while beneficiaries 
of  all three programmes (HABP, OFSP and PSNP) 
have improved food security by 1.53 months; 
holdings of  livestock units have increased by 0.38 
tropical livestock units (TLUs); and the number of  
children’s meals consumed increased by 0.15 in the 
lean season. For recipients, access to the PSNP/
OFSP/HABP has increased the likelihood of  using 
fertiliser by nearly 20 per cent, and of  investing in 
stone terracing by 13 per cent (ibid.). Overall, the 
study found improvements in household assets, 
incomes, food production and nutrition as a result 
of  these food security programmes. Moreover, 
the World Bank study (Woldehanna, Tsehaye and 
Hill 2014) indicated that the PSNP was able to 
reduce the national incidence of  poverty by 2 per 
cent in 2010/11. However, the programme has 
shortcomings. It is mainly rural and targets farming 
households. It does not include the urban poor. 
Secondly, it responds to food insecurity caused by 
natural calamities, mainly production decline due 
to rain shortage. This means that it is not aimed at 
life challenges that emerge as a result of  food price 
volatility. The state has come under pressure from 
the public to intervene.
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4.1 Public pressure
The study shows that many people do not ask for food 
from the government because they ‘know’ that it does 
not provide. To assist those who do have the courage 
to ask for help, the local official tends to encourage 
people to deal with their own situation. She or he may 
also coordinate with non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) that might be ready to respond to the aid 
requests. In 2013, for example, the head of  Women, 
Children and Youth Affairs (WCYA) for the urban 
study site said: ‘There are also people who apply to 
my office for some kind of  food aid. I have told them 
that as food aid does not bring sustainable solution 
to their food crises, they have to work hard and seek 
other solutions by themselves.’12
The state assumes that by creating job opportunities 
and service provision for the public, people will 
enhance their buying capacity. In urban areas, officials 
are concerned with creating job opportunities such 
as working on cobblestone, road construction and 
condominium housing construction for youth, and 
in rural areas giving training and supply of  modern 
agricultural inputs to improve productivity. There 
are no institutional structures that respond to those 
who go hungry as a result of  food price hikes. Thus 
people on uncertain incomes continue to press the 
state to respond to the new situation. The pressure 
emanates from all sections of  the population, including 
government officials. A Women’s Affairs officer13 
from the rural community stated: ‘The government is 
responsible. Next to God, the government is considered 
as father of  its citizens and father does not remain silent 
when his children are hungry.’
Many of  our respondents argue that the new 
economic challenges are emanating from poor 
market regulation and they believe that price stability 
can only be achieved through the intervention of  
the state. One farmer14 from Eastern Oromia asked: 
‘Why does the government prefer to keep silent, not 
help the poor and the most disadvantaged ones who 
are suffering a lot from the increase in the price of  
food items?’. This is echoed by many from both the 
rural and urban communities.
4.2 State response
How does the state intervene? It has responded with 
efforts towards immediate price control and institutional 
arrangements to supply consumer goods at cheaper 
prices and provide legal protection to consumers.
Price controls
In 2010, the Federal Ministry of  Trade made 
attempts to control prices, first by prohibiting traders 
from hoarding food items in their stores, and second 
by enforcing fixed prices on essential foodstuffs. 
Traders contravening the regulations had their 
licences revoked. Some were also taken to court and 
penalised. Although it seemed to relieve the customers 
temporarily, it did not work out well and traders 
continue to store goods and the consequent shortages 
became severe. The state then promoted consumers’ 
associations in every urban locality and Farmers’ 
Union shops in rural areas. Reviving a practice that 
was first used during the Derg regime of  1974–91, 
when in every kebele community shops (hibret suk) 
supplied inhabitants with necessary consumer items, 
this new process began in 2007 in urban areas, but 
only started operating effectively in the last two years.
Since 2013, there has been a rapid expansion of  
these cooperative shops in every kebele in Addis 
Ababa, including the study site. Former kebele public 
recreation centres have now been transformed into 
cooperative shops and butcheries serving the public. 
The state-run Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 
(EGTE) now buys grains during the harvest season 
at a fair price (not to harm the farmers) and resells 
it at marginal profit. This helps ease the seasonality-
related volatility of  food prices that has been 
affecting farmers and consumers for years. It also 
supplies consumer goods to the cooperatives to 
sell to the public at reasonable prices. For instance, 
sugar is produced locally by state factories and is 
channelled to local consumer cooperatives mainly 
through the state-owned Ethiopian Trading 
Enterprise (ETE). ETE also imports and supplies 
edible oil and agricultural inputs to the cooperatives.
Reduced fertiliser prices and the greater reach of  
government subsidy programmes has produced 
a change that has been felt by local people. For 
example, in 2014, a farmer15 from the rural 
community said, ‘This year, the price of  fertiliser 
decreased from 1,000 birr to 600 birr because the 
Farmers’ Union brought it to the community and 
reduced transport and profit the traders used to 
benefit from.’ Another farmer confirmed:
[T]he union provided chemical fertilisers and improved 
seeds. I received these items during the farming season (in 
June and July). We also bought sugar and food oil from 
the consumers’ cooperatives. The price of  both agricultural 
inputs and consumer goods are fair and sometimes cheaper.
As indicated in Figure 2, in our study sites we 
observe that the price of  some food items (sugar, teff 
and maize) and inputs (fertilisers) decreased in 2014, 
but wheat and cooking oil increased. In general, 
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it seems that the overall food price volatility is 
declining and shows stability this year, as seen from 
the aggregate figure (see Table 1).
While state interventions have been useful, it has 
been difficult to meet all the demands of  millions 
of  farmers and consumers. The institutional 
arrangements at federal and local levels are not strong 
enough for full implementation of  the programme. 
Moreover, there are seasonal shortages of  food items 
at market. Farmers are still forced to sell their produce 
during the harvest season at low prices to meet their 
obligations for land tax, school expenses and debts 
for fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. Respondents, 
especially farmers, have suggested that the state 
should help them in rescheduling the payment of  
taxes and debts to avoid these seasonal effects.
Legal protection
Recognising the limitation in meeting the needs of  
consumers, the state has adopted a legal protection that 
would promote fair trade by the business community. 
To control high food price volatility, the Ethiopian 
government issued a decree of  Trade and Consumers’ 
Protection Authority in 2010.16 The objective is to 
accelerate economic development by protecting 
consumers and the business community from unfair 
market practices and misleading market conduct. 
Consumer protection is implemented through the 
provision of  sufficient and accurate information on the 
quality and type of  goods. It could help consumers to 
buy goods selectively and promotes their right to report 
any complaints to the Trade Practice and Consumers’ 
Protection Authority. The proclamation also ensures 
consumers’ eligibility for compensation in case they 
face unfair trading conditions.
During the 2012 fieldwork, the Trade Practices and 
Consumers’ Protection Authority was in the process 
of  building its capacity. It was only established in 
the capital. Soon, it started promoting its objectives 
through the media and through educational 
programmes and trainings. It also began suing 
traders who violated consumers’ rights. In 2014, we 
found that the Authority was taking traders to court 
for unlawfully hoarding consumer goods or for selling 
poor quality food items. During our discussion with 
stakeholders, consumers have welcomed the move 
and they have been collaborating in reporting actions 
of  any faulty traders to the authorities.
Promoting economic growth
It is clear that food price volatility cannot be 
eliminated through price control alone. While legal 
protection and supply of  consumer goods through 
cooperatives remains an important short and mid-
term riposte, the ultimate solution lies in enhancing 
productivity and the purchasing power of  the people.
In urban areas, local authorities were engaged in 
creating job opportunities and advising the public 
how to save. The federal government also instituted 
a salary increment for civil servants in 2014 and 
provided them with free public transport. In rural 
areas local officials advised farmers to use their 
yields properly in both consumption and selling, as 
explained by a kebele leader:17
Figure 2 Prices of grains in birr per kg of grain and 10 litres of oil and other items in the rural community over three 
years, mixed focus group discussion
Source Authors’ own.
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We tell farmers not to sell their crops unless they are 
sure that they have reserved enough food for the family. 
Moreover, people should increase productivity. If  they are 
able to produce surplus, they can cope with the food price 
increase. To increase productivity, farmers are trained and 
advised to use improved seed, fertilisers and pesticides.
Poor farmers are sceptical. The majority do not have 
enough land and oxen to increase productivity. Others 
do not have the financial capacity to buy the requisite 
modern inputs. Land is also, as the farmers put it, 
‘addicted to fertilisers’. They know that they should 
reserve food for their family, but they are forced to put 
their families second to their debts and tax obligations. 
They remain vulnerable to price volatility and look for 
continued support from the state.
5 Concluding remarks
The global market, variable agricultural production 
and irregular trading practices have marked food 
price volatility in Ethiopia over the last decade. 
The recent decline in global prices of  food and 
fuel coupled with state intervention in managing 
the supply of  consumer goods have brought 
some stability in food prices in the last year. Price 
control, supply of  food items at a fair price in every 
neighbourhood, consumer protection, salary increase 
and free public transport for civil servants appears to 
have made some difference to wellbeing. But as these 
measures are limited in scope, there are still many 
poor people struggling to get by in everyday life.
While short-term intervention could help 
mitigate the aggravation of  impacts of  food price 
increases on poor families, more engagement for 
comprehensive food security is necessary. The 
second national Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP2), which is about to be launched, advocates 
for such engagement (NPC forthcoming). The Life 
in a Time of  Food Price Volatility study provides 
some practical insights as to the realities of  grass-
roots-level food security issues that could inform 
the implementation of  GTP2. It demonstrates how 
households are dealing with ongoing food price 
volatility caused by global changes and local realities. 
In our study sites people have some hopes for the 
government’s recent move to enhance productivity 
and youth employment. However, the study shows 
that for farmers rising costs and the timing of  
payment of  debts and taxes remain significant 
hurdles. Within the contexts of  global price increases 
of  fuels and fertilisers, reducing prices could be 
difficult. Providing inputs with improved credit 
and savings facilities and arranging appropriate 
repayment times could help to smooth food prices.
The immediate response to severe food price 
volatility has been helpful to many Ethiopians. People 
encouraged by the outcome of  the state response so 
far are looking for further interventions that will help 
them increase their purchasing power and reduce 
uncertainty. The job opportunities created so far 
are appreciated, but are not sufficient to enhance 
the purchasing power of  the people in a sustainable 
manner. There is more to be done. It is interesting 
to note that a government which came to power 
by defeating the previous state that had pursued a 
command economy, may end up taking the same 
economic route. By pursuing a free-market economy, 
the state has made possible significant economic 
growth over the last decade. But it seems that it is 
now caught between its policy of  free-market-based 
growth on the one hand, and responding to public 
demand by intervening in the market in ways that 
redistribute wealth, on the other. Would this be a 
developmental state in the making in Ethiopia? We, 
as researchers, would like to see how this works in the 
future and how it affects the study communities in 
particular and the country in general.
Notes
1 www.ids.ac.uk/project/life-in-a-time-of-food-
price-volatility.
2 The second local administrative tier above kebele. 
3 Eastern Oromia, 2012.
4 Iddir – funeral savings group.
5 Eastern Oromia, 2013.
6 Shiro wot is a dish made of  chickpeas, spices and 
butter.
7 Addis Ababa, 2012.
8 Addis Ababa, 2012.
9 Enjera is fermented bread made from teff flour, an 
Ethiopian grain.
10 Teff enjera – see endnote 9.
11 Kebele – a village or a local administrative structure 
in a town.
12 Addis Ababa, 2013.
13 Eastern Oromia, 2013.
14 Eastern Oromia, 2013.
15 Eastern Oromia, 2013.
16 Proclamation No. 685/2010.
17 Eastern Oromia, 2012.
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